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2018 brought a continuation of the economic growth in Belarus which started in 2017 and 
which followed a period of recession that had lasted several years. This does not equate to 
a genuine improvement in the condition of the Belarusian economy, which is still based on 
ineffective methods of planning and management dating back to Soviet times. Independent 
Belarusian economists and foreign experts agree that Belarus is currently stuck in a low-
growth trap of around 2–3% annually, which prevents it from catching up with other coun-
tries of the region. In addition, Belarus’s economic situation is aggravated by the fact that, 
since mid-2018, Russia has been increasing the rate at which it is reducing its subsidies. These 
subsidies are among the main drivers of economic growth and form the precondition of the 
stability of the Belarusian economy as a whole. Moscow is making its continued support for 
Belarus conditional on Minsk’s readiness to engage in genuine integration under the  Union 
State of Russia and Belarus, which has formally been in place since 1999. As a consequence, 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is now facing the challenge of either maintaining Belarus’s 
independence from Russia or losing at least a portion of Russian subsidies that currently ac-
count for 10% of Belarus’s GDP. An economic overhaul could be an alternative to the support 
Minsk receives from Moscow. However, the reforms implemented so far are limited and relate 
mainly to the IT sector as well as small and medium-sized companies. Fearing an excessive 
weakening of his system of power, in particular in the context of the upcoming presidential 
election, Lukashenka will continue to block more decisive actions, including the privatisation 
or closing of selected unprofitable state-controlled industrial plants. This means that Minsk 
will need to seek an agreement with Moscow despite the latter stepping up its demands. 
The price of this agreement will be Belarus’s increasing dependence of Russia. 
An illusory improvement in economic 
indicators 
In 2018, the Belarusian economy continued 
to grow. The country’s GDP increased by 3% 
(compared with 2.5% in 2017), which was 
possible mainly due to the 5.7% boost in 
industrial production1. In the same period, 
1	 ‘Рост	промпроизводства	в	2018	 году	оказался	ниже,	
чем	в	2017	году’,	17	January	2019,	https://www.belry-
nok.by/2019/01/17/rost-promproizvodstva-v-2018-godu-
v-belarusi-okazalsya-nizhe-chem-v-2017-godu
a decline of almost 40% was recorded in the 
profit	 earned	 by	 Belarusian	 companies	 and	
the	proportion	of	unprofitable	companies	was	
15%, including mainly state-controlled indus-
trial plants2. At the same time, an increase 
in the stock of unsold goods was recorded 
–	 on	 1	 January	 2019	 it	 was	 worth	 around 
2	 ‘Чистая	 прибыль	 беларусских	 организаций	 упала	
почти	на	40%	за	2018	год’,	15	February	2019,	https://
findirector.by/news/chistaya-pribyl-belarusskikh-organi-
zatsiy-upala-pochti-na-40-za-2018-god/
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US$ 2 billion3.	 The	amount	of	overdue	pay-
ments between companies also remains high; 
at present it is nearing US$ 4 billion. The low 
level	 of	 solvency	 of	 Belarusian	 companies	
mainly	results	from	a	deficit	of	funds.	In	2018,	
as many as 42% of companies reported that 
they struggled with this problem and a third 
of them operated based only on loans. Both 
the	cost	and	the	availability	of	loans	are	a	ma-
jor problem for many Belarusian companies4. 
All	these	factors	confirm	that	the	Belarusian	
economy	is	characterised	by	low	competitive-
ness	and	is	still	based	on	the	Soviet-type	com-
mand economy model.
As	 in	 previous	 years,	 the	 policy	 pursued	 by	
the central bank has been the factor that 
stabilised the macroeconomic situation. The 
bank’s	consistent	financial	policy	has	made	it	
possible	to	maintain	a	low	level	of	inflation;	in	
2018	it	was	5.6%.	The	volume	of	currency	re-
serves	remains	relatively	high,	i.e.	around	US$	
7	billion	(in	2018	the	central	bank’s	reserves	
decreased by a mere 2.2%)5. In 2018, foreign 
debt also remained stable – it was around 
US$ 16–17 billion (or 28% of Belarus’s GDP). 
On	 the	one	hand,	 this	 should	be	 viewed	as	
proof	of	efficiency	of	the	central	bank’s	policy	
because	it	prevented	external	 liabilities	from	
increasing	 further.	 However,	 the	 Belarusian	
government	was	unable	to	reduce	the	coun-
3	 ‘Запасы	 готовой	 продукции	 в	 белорусской	
промышленности	 растут	 четвертый	 месяц	 подряд’,	
27	January	2019,	https://naviny.by/new/20190127/15485 
75981-zapasy-gotovoy-produkcii-v-belorusskoy-prom 
yshlennosti-rastut-chetvertyy 
4	 В.	Орехов,	‘Денег	нет.	Кто	виноват?	И	что	с	ним	делать?’,	
19	February	2019,	https://neg.by/novosti/otkrytj/deneg-net
5 Data compiled by the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Belarus. See https://www.nbrb.by/
try’s	debt	and	limited	itself	to	refinancing	it,	
which in turn resulted in a surge in the cost 
of	servicing	the	debt.	Due	to	Lukashenka’s	re-
luctance to implement economic reforms, in 
recent years Belarus was unable to take out 
a	low-interest	stabilisation	loan	from	the	IMF	
and	is	now	forced	to	use	more	expensive	debt	
instruments	(for	example	to	issue	bonds	with	
a yield of 6–7%) and to seek politically moti-
vated	 loans	 from	Russia.	As	a	 consequence,	
in	 2019	 as	 much	 as	 US$	 1.1	 billion	 out	 of 
a total foreign debt of US$ 2.7 billion will be 
spent	on	servicing	debt	(an	increase	of	30%	
as compared with 2018)6. According to the 
latest	forecasts,	over	the	next	three	years	as	
much as a third of the total foreign currency 
debt (worth US$ 12 billion) will be spent on 
servicing	this	debt.	
The situation in foreign trade, which accounts 
for 50% of Belarus’s GDP and is of strategic 
importance for the state’s functioning, is also 
difficult.	In	2018,	a	negative	trade	balance	of	
US$ 4.6 billion was recorded (as compared 
with	2017,	which	showed	an	improvement	of	
around	US$	300	million).	Over	the	same	pe-
riod,	a	rapid	decline	in	Belarus’s	trade	deficit	
with Russia was registered – it stood at US$ 
9.6	 billion	 in	 2018	 (as	 compared	 with	 US$	
6.7 billion in 2017). This was the worst re-
sult since 2012 and if it continues it may pose 
a serious threat to the stability of Belarus’s 
balance of payments. 
Positive	 figures	 were	 recorded	 for	 Belarus’s	
trade with the EU. In 2018, the traditionally 
positive	trade	balance	with	EU	countries	rose	
almost three-fold as compared with 2017, to 
reach US$ 3 billion. This major increase was 
caused	by	favourable	prices	on	the	market	of	
petroleum products that are Belarus’s basic 
exports	 sold	 mainly	 to	 EU	 markets	 (in	 par-
ticular the United Kingdom and the Nether-
6	 ‘Расходы	на	обслуживание	госдолга	Беларуси	в	2019 
году	 вырастут	 на	 30%	 до	 Br3	 млрд	 –	 премьер-
министр’,	 31	 October	 2018,	 https://www.interfax.by/
news/belarus/1249885	
The government was unable to reduce the 
country’s debt and limited itself to refi-
nancing it, which in turn resulted in a 30% 
increase in the cost of servicing the debt. 
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lands).	 In	2018,	 the	 value	of	 exports	 in	 this	
category rose by 22.3% to US$ 6.4 billion 
(which	 accounted	 for	 60%	 of	 Belarus’s	 ex-
ports	to	the	EU).	A	favourable	price	situation	
was also recorded in the production of potas-
sium	fertilisers.	The	value	of	this	sector’s	ex-
ports in 2018 rose by 20% to US$ 2.7 billion7. 
As	 in	previous	years,	other	major	sources	of	
export	 revenue	 included	 the	 food	 industry	
(US$ 5.2 billion) and the armaments industry 
(US$ 1 billion). Special emphasis should be 
placed on the IT sector which in recent years 
has shown a growth dynamic that is unprec-
edented in Belarus. In 2018, the IT sector’s 
exports	rose	by	as	much	as	a	third	(compared	
with 2017) to US$ 1.5 billion. At present, the 
sector accounts for 5.5% of Belarus’s GDP8. 
The reduction in Russian subsidies 
In	 the	context	of	 the	structural	problems	of	
the	 inefficient	 Belarusian	 economic	 model,	
which	have	been	mounting	 for	many	 years,	
in 2018 the main threat to the stability of the 
Belarusian economy was connected with the 
increasing reduction of subsidies from Russia. 
Intending	 to	 force	 Alyaksandr	 Lukashenka	
to show full loyalty, the Russian leadership 
reached for the strategy of reducing Russia’s 
support for Belarus, a strategy which has 
been used many times before. Belarus con-
tinues to be dependent on preferential sup-
7 Data compiled by the Belarusian Statistics Committee. 
See http://www.belstat.gov.by/
8 Based on this sector’s high dynamic, the Belarusian lead-
ership estimates that in 2022–2023 its share in the coun-
try’s	GDP	will	be	10%.	See	С.	Юшкевич,	‘Крутой:	Доля	
IT-сектора	в	Беларуси	может	составить	10%	от	ВВП’, 
20	February	2019,	http://www.belmarket.by/krutoy-dol-
ya-it-sektora-v-belarusi-mozhet-sostavit-10-ot-vvp
plies of Russian fuels, loans and access to the 
attractive	 Russian	market.	 In	October	 2018,	
Moscow	 suspended	 its	 export	 of	 most	 pe-
troleum products to Belarus until the end of 
2019,	 thereby	 aiming	 to	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	
practice	 of	 Belarus	 re-exporting	 Russian	 pe-
troleum products or re-selling them in the 
domestic market at a lower price. This large-
scale practice has been in place for many 
years (in 2017 Belarus imported 3.2 million 
tons	of	fuels)	and	has	brought	a	major	profit	
for the Belarusian fuel sector. Potential losses 
Belarus may suffer as a result of the suspen-
sion	of	exports	are	estimated	at	around	US$	
1 billion9. 
In December 2018, the Russian leadership 
significantly	 stepped	 up	 pressure	 on	 Bela-
rus	by	communicating	to	the	government	in	
Minsk its demand to resume the process of 
Russian-Belarusian integration under the Un-
ion State (this has been suspended for more 
than a decade). The Kremlin is making its con-
tinued support for Minsk conditional on Be-
larus’s decision in this respect. At stake is the 
payment of compensation for losses resulting 
from	the	reform	of	taxes	collected	in	the	pet-
rochemical	sector	(the	so-called	tax	manoeu-
vre)	 that	 Russia	 is	 currently	 implementing.	
Changes	to	the	Russian	fiscal	policy	planned	
for	2019–2024	will	strip	Belarus	of	its	current	
preferential	price	for	oil.	As	a	consequence,	in	
2019	Belarus’s	 losses	will	amount	 to	almost	
US$ 400 million10, and in 2024 they will reach 
US$ 2 billion (almost 4% of Belarus’s GDP). 
9	 Д.	 Иванович,	 ‘Минус	 нефтепродукты.	 Россия	 опять 
снижает	 уровень	 финансовой	 поддержки	
Беларуси’,	 20	 October	 2018,	 https://naviny.by/arti-
cle/20181020/1540023559-minus-nefteprodukty-rossi-
ya-opyat-snizhaet-uroven-finansovoy-podderzhki
10 The situation in the Belarusian oil sector is additionally 
complicated	by	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	entering	a	difficult	pe-
riod	 of	 reduced	 Russian	 subsidies	 with	 a	 deficit	 of	 over	
US$ 350 million in 2018. The poor condition of the pet-
rochemical sector was caused by high modernisation 
costs,	the	low	profitability	of	petrol	sold	in	the	domestic	
market	and	unfavourable	currency	exchange	fluctuations.	
See	Д.	Иванович,	 ‘Как	 сделать	целую	отрасль	 глубоко	
убыточной?	Провести	модернизацию’,	23	February	2019,	
https://naviny.by/article/20190222/1550852590-kak-sde-
lat-celuyu-otrasl-gluboko-ubytochnoy-provesti-modern-
izaciyu
The increasing rate of the reduction of 
subsidies from Russia has become the 
main threat to the stability of the Belaru-
sian economy.
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Minsk estimates the total cost of these losses 
in	the	next	five	years	at	US$	10–11	billion.	
The price of gas paid by Belarusian users is 
a major burden for the Belarusian economy. It 
is almost twice as high as the corresponding 
price	applied	in	Russia	(in	2019	it	is	US$	127	per 
1,000 m3 in Belarus), which considerably in-
creases	Belarus’s	 trade	deficit	with	Russia	and	
reduces	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 Belarusian	
goods in the Russian market11. Despite attempts 
to	diversify	gas	supplies,	at	present	there	is	no	
genuine	cost-efficient	alternative	to	Russian	fu-
els.	Moreover,	Russia	continues	to	be	Belarus’s	
main	export	market.	In	2018,	it	accounted	for	
38%	of	 Belarusian	 exports12. In some sectors, 
for	example	the	agricultural	and	foodstuff	pro-
duction sector, this is as high as 80%. Along-
side	 this,	 Belarus’s	 financial	 dependence	 on	
Russian	loans	has	increased	significantly.	In	the	
structure of Belarus’s foreign debt repayment 
in	2019,	liabilities	to	Russian	creditors	account	
for 65% of all liabilities and a practice has be-
come	established	to	re-finance	older	loans	from	
Russia by taking out new loans, with no inten-
tion	of	diversifying	the	sources	of	funding13. 
The warnings from the IMF
Experts	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	
argue that Russian subsidies are of key im-
portance for the functioning of the Belaru-
sian economy. According to their calculations, 
there is a clear relation between the rate of 
economic	 growth	 in	 Belarus	 and	 the	 size	 of	
support granted to it by Russia. The reduction 
11	 K.	 Kłysiński,	 M.	 Menkiszak,	 J.	 Strzelecki,	 ‘Russia	 puts	
pressure on Belarus’, OSW Analyses, 14 December 
2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2018-12-14/russia-puts-pressure-belarus 
12 Data compiled by the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus 
in	the	Russian	Federation.	See	http://www.embassybel.
ru/trade-relations/
13	 ‘В  2019	 году	 Беларуси	 надо	 выплатить	 Москве	
65%	 внешнего	 госдолга’,	 17	 January	 2017,	 https://
news.tut.by/economics/623023.html;	 ‘Белоруссия	
попросила	 у	 России	 кредит	 на	 покрытие	 долга 
в	 600$	 млн’,	 27	 February	 2019,	 https://www.rbc.ru/
politics/27/02/2019/5c765f4d9a79473dc1a7fe90?utm_
source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop
of subsidies in recent years from 17% of GDP 
in 2013 to the present 10% has triggered an 
economic slowdown14.	Moreover,	the	absence	
of compensation for Belarus under the so-
called	 tax	manoeuvre	 in	 the	 oil	 industry	will	
cause Belarus’s debt to increase from the cur-
rent 55% of its GDP to 70% in 2023, which will 
pose	a	threat	to	the	country’s	financial	stabil-
ity15.	At	the	same	time,	experts	warn	against	
the low-growth trap. According to their fore-
casts,	 in	2018–2023	the	average	rate	of	eco-
nomic growth in Belarus will be 2.2% of GDP, 
which	 is	 lower	 than	 the	 expected	 figure	 for	
other countries of the region and considera-
bly lower than what is necessary for the largely 
backward	Belarusian	economy	to	develop.	In-
dependent	Belarusian	experts	estimate	that	in	
2030	Belarus	could	only	reach	Slovakia’s	cur-
rent	standards	of	living	(calculated	as	GDP	per 
capita according to purchasing power parity) 
if its annual rate of economic growth is around 
7–8%.	 These	 expert	 forecasts	 clearly	 indicate	
that the Belarusian leadership is facing an ur-
gent	need	of	an	economic	overhaul	that	would	
include state-controlled industrial companies, 
which	have	so	far	enjoyed	protection.
14	 Т.	 Маненок,	 KEF-2018: ‘Беларусь	 должна	 взять	 курс	
не	только	на	модернизацию,	но	и	на	приватизацию’, 
15	November	2018,	http://www.belrynok.by/2018/11/15/
kef-2018-belarus-dolzhna-vzyat-kurs-ne-tolko-na-mod-
ernizatsiyu-no-i-na-privatizatsiyu/ 
15 Attention should be paid to major differences between 
the	methodology	of	calculating	GDP	applied	by	the	IMF	
and	the	one	applied	by	the	Belarusian	government.	Ac-
cording	 the	 Belarusian	Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 at	 present	
the proportion of total debt to the country’s GDP is 35%. 
See	Д.	Заяц,	 ‘Беларуси	придется	слезть	с	российской	
финансовой	 иглы’,	 21	 January	 2019,	 https://naviny.
by/article /20190121/1548049215-belarusi-pridet-
sya-slezt-s-rossiyskoy-finansovoy-igly; Data compiled by 
the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Republic	of	Belarus,	http://
www.minfin.gov.by/ru/public_debt/condition/ 
The Belarusian leadership is facing an ur-
gent need of an economic overhaul that 
would include state-controlled companies, 
which have so far enjoyed protection.
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Is Prime Minister Rumas on a mission 
to reform the economy?
On 18 August 2018, President Alyaksandr 
Lukashenko	carried	out	a	major	government	
reshuffle,	dismissing	the	prime	minister,	four	
out	of	five	deputy	prime	ministers,	and	sev-
eral ministers, including those in charge of 
economic policy. Syarhey Rumas, an econ-
omist considered a supporter of reforms 
who	previously	 had	 served	 as	 the	 president	
of	 the	 state-owned	Development	Bank,	was	
nominated the new prime minister. In the 
context	 of	 tension	 in	 Russian-Belarusian	
relations, which had been mounting for 
some time, the new prime minister’s main 
task	 was	 to	 find	 new	 sources	 of	 economic	
growth	 that	 would	 form	 an	 alternative	 to	
the gradually dwindling Russian subsidies16. 
This	 meant	 that	 more	 comprehensive	 eco-
nomic	reforms	were	required.	In	his	govern-
ment agenda until 2020, announced in Oc-
tober 2018, Prime Minister Rumas listed his 
main	tasks,	which	included:	an	improvement	
in	 conditions	 for	 doing	 business,	 develop-
ment of the IT sector, digitisation of the econ-
omy,	and	efficient	management	of	state-con-
trolled companies17. 
Measures	taken	in	recent	months	confirm	the	
state’s	positive	attitude	towards	the	SME	sec-
tor	that	has	been	evident	over	the	last	several	
16	 See	W.	 Konończuk,	 ‘Government	 reshuffle	 in	 Belarus’,	
OSW Analyses, 22 August 2018, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-08-22/government-re-
shuffle-belarus-0
17	 ‘Представление	 Программы	 деятельности	 Прави- 
тельства	на	2018-2020	годы’,	http://www.government.
by/ru/content/8356
years.	At	present,	this	sector	is	viewed	as	one	
of	 the	main	 drivers	 of	 the	 Belarusian	 econ-
omy’s	growth.	 This	 is	why	 the	new	govern-
ment	 adopted	 the	 SME	 development	 strat-
egy to 2030 intended to increase the share 
of	 private	 businesses	 in	 Belarus’s	 GDP	 from	
the current 25% to 50%18.	The	amended	fis-
cal	code,	which	came	into	effect	on	1	January	
2019,	does	not	 significantly	 reduce	 the	 cur-
rent	 tax	burden	but	 it	 does	 introduce	more	
business-friendly solutions19. Alongside this, 
announcements	have	been	made	to	stop	the	
practice of granting command-based (i.e. not 
economically	 justified)	 loans	 to	 state-con-
trolled companies by 2020. Another an-
nouncement was made regarding the man-
agement of state-controlled companies which 
needs	to	be	improved,	for	example	by	reduc-
ing	 the	 level	 of	 control	 of	 these	 companies	
on the part of the central authorities, and by 
increasing the role of professional managerial 
staff in running these companies. Attempts 
have	been	made	to	resume	negotiations	with	
the	IMF	regarding	a	new	stabilisation	loan.	In	
January	2019,	the	government	formed	a	task	
force	 for	 devising	 a	 road	map	 of	 economic	
reforms in close cooperation with the World 
Bank. A similar task force operated in 2015 
when Belarus was seeking a loan from the 
IMF	worth	US$	3	billion20.
The prospects for economic reforms
Recent	 developments	 in	 Belarusian-Russian	
relations,	 which	 have	 been	 unfavourable	
for Minsk, clearly indicate that the Kremlin 
18	 А.	Ярошевич,	‘„Лед	тронулся”.	Власти	сделали	высокую	
ставку	на	частный	бизнес’,	8	November	2018,	https://nav-
iny.by/article/20181108/1541650507-led-tronulsya-vlasti-
sdelali-vysokuyu-stavku-na-chastnyy-biznes
19	 ‘Налоговый	 кодекс	 Беларуси.	 Обзор	 изменений’,	
PWC Belarus, https://www.pwc.by/ru/publications/pdf/
Alert%20Tax%20Code%202019_PwC%20Belarus_rus.pdf
20	Д.	Заяц,	‘Власти	Беларуси	начали	подготовку	к	новым	
переговорам	с	МВФ’,	18	January	2019,	https://naviny.
by/article/20190118/1547790055-vlasti-belarusi-nacha-
li-podgotovku-k-novym-peregovoram-s-mvf. In 2017, 
talks	with	the	IMF	ended	in	failure	due	to	the	Belarusian	
leadership rejecting the proposed reform programme. 
Recent developments in Belarusian- 
Russian relations, which are unfavourable 
for Minsk, indicate that the Kremlin contin-
ues to have a major impact on the condition 
of the Belarusian economy.
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continues	to	have	a	major	impact	on	the	con-
dition of the Belarusian economy. By manip-
ulating	the	size	of	subsidies	as	it	sees	fit,	the	
Russian leadership is trying to force Belarus to 
agree to concessions, including the genuine 
integration of the two states. This is causing 
a serious threat not only to Belarus’s econom-
ic	stability	but	also	to	its	sovereignty.	It	seems	
that the implementation of the strategy to 
boost the country’s economic independence, 
for	example	by	increasing	the	share	of	private	
businesses (including the dynamic IT sector) 
in Belarus’s GDP, alongside the reduction of 
the	 significance	 of	 heavy	 industry	 (which	 is	
dependent on Russian support) is a good 
move.	 However,	 in	 Belarus’s	 authoritarian	
regime	 an	 overhaul	 of	 the	 economy	 is	 an	
extremely	difficult	task.	It	should	be	remem-
bered	 that	 the	 government	 headed	 by	 Ru-
mas,	which	devised	 the	proposed	economic	
reforms, is able to operate only within limits 
set	by	Lukashenka.	For	the	prospective	trans-
formation to succeed it would be necessary to 
close	unprofitable	companies	and	restructure	
(privatise)	 more	 promising	 ones.	 However,	
this may destabilise the social situation and 
strip	the	government	of	control	of	that	por-
tion of society which is employed in the state 
sector.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 parliamentary	 and	
presidential elections scheduled for the third 
quarter	of	2020	at	the	latest,	maintaining	so-
cial peace will be of particular importance for 
the	continued	existence	of	Lukashenka’s	sys-
tem of power. This is why, regardless of its an-
nouncements, in the short- and medium-term 
perspective,	the	government	will	avoid	mak-
ing	radical	economic	moves	and	will	prefer	to	
launch a gradual and cautious reorganisation 
of	 the	Belarusian	economy	and	 to	seek	sav-
ings. This means that Belarus will be forced 
to seek an agreement with Russia in order to 
retain at least a portion of its subsidies.
